Aims: This is the first part of a two-part paper that takes an explorative approach to assess crisis and austerity in European countries during the Great Recession. The ultimate aim of this two-part paper is to explore the "crisis-austerity" thesis by Stuckler and Basu and assess whether it is the interplay between austerity and crisis, rather than the current economic crisis per se, that can led to deterioration in population health. In Part I of this paper we offer one way of operationalizing crisis severity and austerity. We examine countries as specific configurations of crisis and policy responses and classify European countries into "ideal types." Methods: Cases included were 29 countries participating in the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) surveys. Based on fuzzy set methodology, we constructed two fuzzy sets, "austerity" and "severe crisis." Austerity was measured by changes in welfare generosity; severe crisis was measured by changes in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth. Results: In the initial phase of the Great Recession, most countries faced severe crisis combined with no austerity. From 2010-2011 onward, there was a divide between countries. Some countries consistently showed signs of austerity policies (with or without severe crisis); others consistently did not.
Introduction
The first part of this two-part paper takes an explorative approach to assess different kinds of crisis and austerity trajectories across European countries during the Great Recession. Part II assesses how configurations of these two phenomena are related to changes in population health 5 years into the economic downturn. After a decade of economic growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita declined in 2009 (4.5% on average), Poland being the sole exception within the EU [1] . Between mid-2007 and mid-2013 the unemployment rates in Greece and Spain increased by above 8 percentage points, while in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia the increase was more than 5 percentage points [2] . Public social spending in per cent of GDP increased in all Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 2007-2008 to 2012-2013, with the exception of Hungary [2] . Notably, the biggest increases in expenditure in this period were seen in countries with relatively strong GDP growth and greater spending power, and not in those countries where deep downturns created the greatest need for benefits provided by the welfare state [2] . The sharp decline in GDP in some countries accounted in part for the rising spending relative to GDP [2] .
During the early phase of the crisis, EU governments provided fiscal stimulus packages and automatic stabilizers (e.g. benefits to the unemployed and reduced personal income taxes), which cushioned the effect of the crisis for private households in most countries [3] . As the crisis continued, these policies were reversed in 2010, when many austerity measures were introduced, often involving both increased income taxes and decreased benefits [3] [4] [5] . Austerity soon became the "default" policy response to the financial crisis in the Eurozone countries. The slow recovery that had begun in 2010 and 2011 in many countries stopped and in the latter part of 2012 the Eurozone as a whole contracted for the first time [4, 5] .
Three opposing views on the proper response to the crisis are those held by "Keynesians," "austerians," and "neo-Marxists" [6] [7] [8] . While Keynesians stress the importance of stimulating consumption and demand in times of "slump" [6, 8] , austerians emphasize "expansionary austerity," arguing that cutting social spending will ultimately lead to growth due to restored "business confidence" [4] [5] [6] . By cutting spending, governments show that they will not crowd out other market investments or add to the debt burden (cf. Blyth [4] ). For neo-Marxists, economic crises are embedded in capitalism and rooted in the contradiction between labor and capital. Hence, their policy response is abolition of capitalism itself [7] .
Recessions and health
Since the financial crisis hit the world economy in 2008, we have seen a growing research interest in how economic downturns affect population health [9] [10] [11] . Among the theoretical approaches that have been developed, one prominent perspective stands out, namely the notion that it is not the crisis per se that has a negative impact on population health; rather, it is the policy responses taken by national governments to meet the crisis, responses that are often imposed by international finance institutions. Stuckler and Basu [12] express this view succinctly: "… the real danger to public health is not recession per se, but austerity." Those who support this view emphasize risk factors such as mass unemployment, fear of job loss, precarious work, reduced income, perceived financial hardship, deterioration of living conditions, less healthy lifestyles, weakening of social security and employment protection, and stress related to hopelessness, anxiety and general insecurity [10] [11] [12] . Recent quantitative comparative studies from different parts of the world appear to support this finding: negative health effects of unemployment are mitigated by spending on active labor market policies, spending on social protection, and benefit generosity [13, 14] . However, some results show worsened health in times of economic downturns despite strong social safety nets (see, e.g., Gerdtham and Johannesson [15] ) while others show that countries with comprehensive austerity policies did not necessarily experience worse health outcomes compared with countries with less austere policy responses (e.g. Tapia Granados and Rodriguez [16] ). Still others report improving health in times of economic slump (e.g. Ruhm [17] ).
To assess the hypothesis by Stuckler and Basu [12] we need a research design that examines the interplay between crisis and policies when impacting on health, rather than their distinct and separate impacts. The method must be sensitive to the fact that there is a high correlation between severity of the crisis and policies. Fuzzy set methodology lends itself nicely to such a task [18] , representing a fairly novel methodological approach that may shed new light on the link between economic downturns and health. Other studies have adopted fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to study health outcomes (see, e.g., McNamara [19] ). There are several advantages in using a fuzzy set approach to the problem at hand. The first is that it is theory-driven. In this case, the theory, in our interpretation, addresses the interaction between crisis and policies, and fsQCA is designed to handle exactly such issues. This opens up for the possibility that effects may reinforce each other, for example that a deep crisis combined with austerity policies is particularly damaging to population health. Moreover, there are likely different "paths" or combinations of conditions that are linked to health changes across countries. The fuzzy set method is useful in research designs that involve small and mid-size numbers such as 20-30 [18] , the number of countries in this case. Lastly, a fuzzy set "ideal type" analysis allows us to study diversity and change across countries [20] during the recession.
Against this backdrop we take an explorative approach in two interlinked papers to assess crisis and austerity across European countries (Part I), and their impact on population health (Part II).
Data and methods
This study includes 29 countries participating in the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) surveys. In fuzzy set analysis, the analysis is based on fuzzy sets instead of variables. These fine-grained continuous measures are calibrated rather than measured, which means that they should be based on theoretical as well as substantial knowledge considered relevant to the set memberships at hand. Fuzzy sets are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative, showing degrees of memberships in different kinds of sets [18] . In this paper, the task is to operationalize fuzzy sets and establish scores for what qualifies as "severe economic crisis" and "austerity." We assess each country's degree of membership in the intersection between different combinations of conditions.
Fuzzy sets: severe crisis and austerity
In line with Starke et al. [21] , an "economic crisis" can be perceived as a "sudden, and often unexpected, deterioration of most, or all, key macroeconomic indicators" including GDP growth. The crisis is international when a large number of countries experience it simultaneously [21] . GDP is a conventional and important measure of the national output of an economy. A drop in GDP is serious as it signifies products that were not produced and consumed and wages that were not earned. In this paper, we operationalize the "severe crisis" dimension by percentage changes in GDP per capita growth from the pre-crisis level (2007) . Annual data on GDP per capita growth for all EU-SILC countries are available from the World Bank [22] .
The choice of austerity indicator depends on both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, cuts in social expenditures have been one important dimension of the policy responses to the crisis [3] . Social spending as a percentage of GDP is a highly applied measure within the comparative social policy literature. However, this measure is sensitive to country wealth and population size, as well as to the level of need, among other things [23] . Here we apply social expenditures on sickness/healthcare, disability, family/children, unemployment, housing, and social exclusion, but not on pensions and survivors' benefits, in euro per inhabitant at constant 2005 prices. The data are available from Eurostat's European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics [24] . As the increase in spending in the early years of the recession was driven more by rising numbers of beneficiaries than by higher entitlements [2] , social spending as a percentage of GDP has been sensitive to changes in need. We adjust spending to the inverse of the employment rate (ages 20-64) to take into account the level of need in the population [25] . The resulting measure is a measure of welfare generosity [26] . We operationalize the "austerity" dimension by percentage changes in welfare generosity from the pre-crisis level (2007) . Other possible indicators of austerity are planned fiscal consolidation efforts and actual policy changes. However, data on these are not available for all the EU-SILC countries. In addition, these data offer insight into planned efforts only, and not into actual policies.
We use a "direct calibration method" as described by Ragin [18] to assign fuzzy membership scores. We have looked at the distribution of the data to find adequate breakpoints; however, two points are central to us. Firstly, as all countries have experienced reductions in GDP per capita growth during the period studied we found that it was important to distinguish "crisis" from "severe crisis". Secondly, we assume that any reduction in welfare generosity in a period of economic downturn may negatively influence the social determinants of health. Based on these considerations, the qualitative breakpoints based on raw data for the severe crisis set are set to 50%, decrease on GDP per capita growth for full non-membership (0), 100%, decrease as breakpoint (0.5), and 150% decrease for full membership (1) in the set. The qualitative breakpoints for the austerity sets are set to 0% i.e. no change in welfare generosity for full non-membership (0), 0.1% decrease, as breakpoint (0.5), and 10% decrease, for full membership (1) in the set. Table I shows the empirical indicators and translation of indicators into fuzzy set (fs) scores and labels.
Analysis
After the fs membership scores are assigned, the fsQCA software, version 2.5, is used to translate scores into the log odds metric. Including two conditions gives four (2 2 ) logically possible configurations [18] . The analytical devices based in Boolean algebra are negation, set intersection (logical AND) and set union (logical OR). The values, however, extend the Boolean values of 0 and 1 [18] . To assess a country's degree of membership in the combination of conditions, the lowest membership score among the two conditions (the minimum principle) is applied, i.e. set intersection [18] . To calculate negation (~), membership in the austerity set (A) or the severe crisis set (C) is subtracted from 1 (~A = 1.0 − A). We also perform a sensitivity analysis with other breakpoints. The results of this analysis are presented in the online Appendix, Supplementary table A4 , available online.
Results -countries' conformity to ideal types
The findings presented in Supplementary table A3 in the online Appendix show that in 2009, 22 out of 29 countries were fully to almost fully in the model combining no austerity with severe crisis (~A·C). Only Poland was part of the model combining no austerity with no crisis (~A·~C) in 2009. There are some exceptions to the overall trend in 2009. For instance, the Nordic countries Iceland and Sweden, together with the Eastern European countries Latvia and Hungary, were fully to almost fully in the model (fs scores ≥ 0.84) combining austerity with severe crisis (A·C). Ireland was also "more or less" in this model (with an fs score of 0.55) and "more or less out" of the model ~A·C (fs score of 0.45). Denmark was an ambiguous case that scored 0.5, i.e. that was at the crossover point in the model ~A·C, and in the model A*C. In 2009 no countries were part of the model A·~C.
In 2010 the two Nordic countries Denmark and Sweden, together with several Eastern European countries including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania, were part of the model combining austerity with no severe crisis (A·~C). Iceland, Latvia, and Ireland remained in the model A·C, now joined by Spain, which moved from being fully (fs score of 1) in the model ~A·C.
In 2010, many countries moved to the model combing no austerity with no severe crisis (~A·~C). They included Finland, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, Malta, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Most of these countries were fully/almost fully in the model (fs score of ≥ 0.84), with the exception of the Netherlands and Slovenia (fs scores of 0.82 and 0.68, respectively). Greece and Cyprus, together with Norway and Romania, continued in the model ~A·C and were fully/almost fully in the model.
In 2011, Finland, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, Malta, Poland, and the Slovak Republic continued in the model combining no austerity and no crisis (~A·~C), joined by Romania from model ~A·C. Many of these countries were "fairly in" the model.
Only Norway continued to be "fairly" in the model ~A·C in 2011 (fs score of 0.74). That year, the impact of the austerity policies introduced in 2010 became more apparent as Greece, Portugal and Cyprus joined Spain in the model A·C. With the exception of Cyprus, these countries were fully/almost fully in the model; however, Greece moved from being fully in model ~A·C, and Portugal moved from being fully in the model ~A·~C. In 2011, Italy and Slovenia moved from model ~A·~C to model ~A·C, where they were joined by Iceland, Latvia and Ireland from model A·C.
In 2012 many countries that were part of the model ~A·~C in 2011 moved back to the model ~A·C, including Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France. Norway, which had been consistently part of the model ~A·C throughout the period, now moved to the model ~A·~C, where it had full membership together with Germany.
Only Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia stayed consistently part of the model A·~C in 2012, of which countries, however, only Latvia was almost fully in the model.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark moved to the model A·C, joining Greece, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus. Countries' conformity to ideal types (>0.5) during the crisis years is shown in Table II .
Discussion
The aim of the first part of this two-part paper is to offer one way of operationalizing crisis and austerity and, by means of a fuzzy set ideal type analysis, assess countries as specific configurations of crisis and policy responses. Results show that in the initial phase of the crisis, i.e. in 2009, most countries experienced severe crisis but did not introduce austerity policies, which is in line with the literature [5] . A few countries, however, showed reductions in welfare generosity from the onset of the crisis, including Iceland, Adapted version after Kvist [20] . Scores that are greater than 0.95 and less than 0.05 may be interpreted at virtually full membership and virtually full non-membership, respectively [81] . For raw data, see Supplementary tables A1 and A2 in the online Appendix.
Sweden, Hungary, and Latvia, as well as Ireland. From 2010-2011 onward there was a divide between countries. Some countries consistently showed signs of austerity policies (with or without severe crisis); others consistently did not. The effects of the crisis in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were particularly strong, including a substantial drop in GDP and increasing unemployment in 2009. Countries in Central Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) tended to be less seriously affected by the crisis than the Baltic States and South eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania) [1] . The Eastern European countries all had a high pre-crisis growth rate (2007), substantially higher than many of the other European countries. Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania implemented extensive cuts in spending, more than any other country in Europe, in 2009 and 2010, and experienced faster economic growth in 2011 and 2012 compared with many other European countries [4] . However, many of these countries have raised substantial sovereign debts since they started cutting their spending [4] . Our analysis nonetheless indicates that Latvia consistently showed signs of austerity from 2009, as did Estonia and Lithuania from 2010 to 2012. Romania, on the other hand, consistently showed no signs of austerity throughout the period studied. Poland is the only country that consistently did not show signs of austerity or face severe crisis throughout the period. The impact of the crisis in Poland was less severe compared with the other Eastern European countries and could be perceived as a slowdown in the economy rather than as a crisis [1] .
Among the Nordic countries, results indicate that Norway, although qualifying as being in "severe crisis" for the greater part of the period, did not respond to the crisis by means of austerity policies, as welfare generosity was not reduced below the 2007 level in any year. Results show that in 2012, Norway was no longer in severe crisis. Our findings indicate that Sweden, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, showed signs of austerity from 2008. Ferrarini et al. [27] report that the replacement rates, particularly for unemployment benefits, but also for sickness benefits and the occupational injuries insurance, were reduced to below the OECD average by 2010 compared with 2005 levels. Our results for Sweden may therefore reflect a general downward trend in replacement rates for social benefits, imposed by the center-right government from the mid-2000s onwards [28] , rather than policy responses to the crisis.
The results for Denmark are less surprising as that country has faced long-lasting economic contractions from the onset of the crisis due to the bursting of a housing and banking bubble, as described by Dølvik et al. [28] . Our results indicate that austerity policies were present from 2010 and throughout the period studied. Also in Denmark the replacement rates for unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and occupational injuries insurance were lower in 2010 than in 2005, as reported by Ferrarini et al. [27] . Our results further show that Finland did not show signs of austerity in any of the 5 years studied. In Finland the replacement rates for unemployment benefits were lowered; however, replacement rates for sickness benefits and occupational injuries insurance did not change [27] .
The literature highlights that the overall situation in Iceland, in contrast to, e.g. Ireland or Greece, improved substantially after the Icelandic government chose not to bail out the banks and take on the debt, and carry out the severe austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [12, 29] . Our analysis, however, indicates that Iceland adopted "austerity" practices, in response to the severe crisis (A·C), from 2008 to 2010. Results also show continuance of austerity after the severe crisis had lost its grip in the latter part, 2011-2012, of the period studied. Iceland introduced fiscal consolidation measures from 2009; however, the country aimed to protect social benefits in line with the government's post-crisis aim to keep the main elements of the Icelandic welfare state [12, 30] . Stuckler and Basu [12] report that Iceland's social protection spending rose as a percentage of GDP between 2007 and 2009, and relative poverty did not increase. The change in social spending was significant also after adjustment to the fall in GDP [12] . However, in 2008 and 2009 GDP growth per capita in Iceland was negative and continued to be so until 2010, and the non-employment rate rose (i.e. the inverse of the employment rate; data not shown). Therefore, the increase in spending may have been driven by increasing numbers of beneficiaries as well as by reductions in GDP. Hence, assessing austerity the way we have done in this paper gives a somewhat less positive picture of the situation as Iceland is among the countries that showed signs of austerity throughout the whole period studied. Data from the OECD [2] also indicate that although relative poverty did not increase much between 2007 and 2010, measuring poverty against a benchmark (keeping constant the value of the 2005 poverty line) shows that "anchored" poverty increased by 2 percentage points or more in several countries including Iceland. These results indicate income losses among the poorer households. Nonetheless, we may speculate that the situation would have turned out to be much more severe if the Icelandic people had chosen differently and accepted the IMF conditions of cutting public spending by as much as 15% of GDP [12] .
In Ireland, benefits continued to increase up to 2010 but fell sharply in 2011 and 2012 [3] . Our results show that after 2008, Ireland followed the same course as Iceland (cf. Figure 1) . In 2012, however, Ireland again experienced severe crisis and showed signs of austerity (A·C).
Germany, representing the largest economy in Europe, experienced an initial sharp decline in growth at the beginning of the crisis due to the collapse in world trade [5, 31] , but recovered quickly in 2010 as growth rebounded. Germany's fiscal stimulus in 2009 and 2010 was among the highest in the OECD member countries [31] , despite a general rejection of Keynesian policies [4] . Our results accordingly show that Germany, with the exception of an initial severe decline in 2009, did not qualify as a "severe crisis" country in the period studied.
The literature shows that the United Kingdom adopted severe austerity measures, at least in the latter part of the period studied [32] . Our results, however, indicate that the United Kingdom did not qualify as an austerity country despite manifestations of severe crisis in the first 2 years of the period (2008) (2009) ). This may, at least in part, have been a continuation of the social welfare policies established by the former Labour government (cf. Mayhew and Wickham-Jones [32] ).
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, together with Cyprus, are the Eurozone periphery countries that were hardest stricken by the Great Recession, resulting in wage cuts, higher taxes, and cuts in public expenditure, as well as privatization and a dramatic increase in unemployment levels. Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus experienced a collapse in the banking system and the property market. The results accordingly show that in 2011 and 2012 Greece qualified as a country with severe crisis that imposed austerity measures. In fact, Greece qualified as a severe crisis country throughout the period studied, as did Spain. According to the literature, the government of Spain introduced austerity measures, in particular from 2012 [33] . Our results, however, indicate that Spain adopted austerity policies along with experiencing severe crisis in 2010 through 2012. Portugal did not qualify as a severe crisis country, nor did it show signs of austerity in 2008-2010. However, in 2011-2012 Portugal introduced austerity measures when faced with severe crisis, as did Cyprus. Italy experienced severe crisis along with austerity in 2012; the Italian government introduced austerity policies from 2011.
Summing up, in this paper we have applied fsQCA to study countries and country-specific configurations of policy measures and crisis response and we have assessed qualitative as well as quantitative differences, i.e. differences in both type and degree as well as changes during the course of the economic downturn. By undertaking a thorough analysis of these two important dimensions and the way they interact in different ways across countries over time, we offer a more valid measure of the crisis than presented through conventional quantitative approaches.
